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THE ROLE OF CONTRACT PRINCIPLES IN
DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF SURROGACY
CONTRACTS
June R. Carbone*
Contract principles, as pillars of the legal system, rest on a societal decision that the most effective way to govern certain types of
relationships is to lend the imprimatur of the state to private agreements.' Contract thus exerts its greatest influence over relationships
where, as a society, we wish to encourage diversity and flexibility in
the nature of the agreements to be enforced, and where we have confidence that the parties, left to their own devices, will reach acceptable bargains. Commercial agreements, at least those between parties
with similar bargaining power, are perhaps the clearest expressions
of socially desirable contracts. So long as there are no overriding social or ethical interests affecting parties beyond those involved in the
bargain, society encourages commercial actors to protect their own
best interests, and the discipline of the market ensures that, in the
long run at least, they will. Enforcement of the private agreements
arising from such bargains, therefore, offers an effective way to encourage productive exchanges.'
If the influence of contract reaches its height in commercial
agreements, however, it has traditionally reached its nadir within the
family. The law has long refused to recognize the validity of many
agreements concerning the family. "Meretricious" agreements were
© 1988 by June Carbone
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. A.B., 1975, Princeton
University; J.D., 1978, Yale University. The author wishes to thank Petra Gemmingen for her
assistance in preparing this article for publication.
1. For a more extended discussion of the nature of contract and its relationship to marriage, see Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage:A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204 (1982).
2. This has not always been true. So long as tradition and traditional institutions were
important in governing commercial relationships, contract was much less important. However,
with the increasing rate of change over the last two centuries, and the increasing emphasis on
innovation, flexibility, and diversity, private agreements have come into their own as a major
form of governance. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 34 (2d ed. 1970).
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void as against public policy,8 agreements between spouses were presumed to be lacking the proper legal intent," even antenuptial agreements faced an uphill battle for recognition.5 Far from encouraging
diversity and flexibility, the law has fixed family relationships and
obligations, treating these matters as too important to be left to the
whims of individuals.
Nonetheless, the latter part of the twentieth century has seen a
major assault on this last remaining bastion of status. The family no
longer governs the major source of wealth within society as employment has replaced property as the most important source of income.
The law now balances the interests of individual family members on
a far more equal scale and, to an increasing degree, diversity and
flexibility characterize intimate relationships generally and reproductive matters in particular. These changes suggest that contract will
place an increasingly important, though as yet undefined, role in
managing such private matters.
The debate now raging over surrogate mother contracts' directly addresses the question of whether intimate matters such as
those concerning human reproduction can be left to individual parties or whether private agreements in this sphere are suspect. Although the controversy concerns a variety of moral, ethical, and religious questions about the nature of human reproduction, the debate
also involves more general questions about the appropriate sphere of
private governance, for determining when the state should embrace
and sanction private agreements and when it should not, and for
separating out the different aspects of such contracts when the agree3. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 341 (2d rev. ed. 1974). Provisions made
"in contemplation of divorce" have long been barred as contributing to the likelihood of divorce. See A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90, at
33-36 (1979).
4. Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571 (1919); MURRAY, supra note 3 § 20, at 33.
5. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 141, 159-63 (1979); Weitzman,
Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1258-59
(1974); Note, For Better or For Worse . . .But Just in Case, Are Antenuptial Agreements
Enforceable?, U. ILL. L. REV. 531 (1982).
6. "Surrogate mother," "surrogacy," and other "surrogate arrangements" will be used
to refer to arrangements where a man contributes sperm to a woman to whom he is not
married for the purpose of conceiving a child to be raised by the genetic father and his wife.
The man contributing the sperm will be termed the "genetic father" of the child to distinguish
him from the husband of the genetic mother. The woman contributing the ovum and carrying
the child to term will be termed the "genetic mother" to distinguish her from the would-be
adoptive mother (the genetic father's wife). The term "genetic" will be used instead of "biological" to distinguish parents who contribute sperm or ovum to the child from parents who make
other biological contributions, such as a mother, who, through the process of in vitro fertilization, carries to term a child conceived from the ovum of a different woman.
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ments fall apart.
This article will examine contract principles as they are applied
to surrogate motherhood, in an effort to provide a framework for
answering these questions. First, the article will compare modern
commercial with more traditional domestic agreements, concluding
that the contract model is most appropriate where: (1) the contract
primarily concerns the interests of the parties to the agreement with
a minimal effect on third parties or society generally; (2) the parties
to the contract are capable of reaching acceptable bargains; and (3)
enforcement would not impose inordinate difficulties on the legal system. Second, the article will explore the reasons why contract has not
traditionally served as a model for family relationships and will examine the extent to which those reasons are still valid. Third, the
article will apply the contract model to surrogate agreements, attempting to define the societal and third party interests at stake, factors that might interfere with the ability of the parties to reach appropriate agreements, and the difficulties of enforcement. Finally, the
article will critique the leading surrogate decision to date, examining
the extent to which judicial reasoning in this area can be interpreted
in terms of contract principles and the extent to which it rests on
normative values alone.
I.

CONTRACT PRINCIPLES

As A

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING

THE VALIDITY OF SURROGATE AGREEMENTS

A. Defining an Appropriate Sphere for Contract: Historical Distinctions Between Domestic and Commercial Contracts
In determining which relationships will lend themselves to private agreement and which will not, it is instructive to begin with a
comparison of modern commercial agreements and more traditional
domestic ones. In undertaking such a comparison, the first, and perhaps most important difference is the degree to which the agreements
implicate interests beyond those of the parties. Commercial agreements, e.g., contracts to sell salt, to engage an architect, to transport
machinery, typically affect only the parties to the bargain.7 For gen7. Where commercial agreements have a substantial impact on others, contract is less
useful and private agreements may be subject to regulation. For example, a contract to construct a factory may be subject to a variety of land use and environmental restrictions that
override the agreement between the landowner and building contractor. Whether such a contract is treated as a private matter or as a matter implicating other parties depends on the
societal framework for the handling of such matters. In frontier America, new construction
may have been treated as entirely a private matter, affecting only the project's immediate
neighbors. Fontainebleu Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla.
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erations, the family, on the other hand, has been treated as a matter
simply too important to be left to the wishes of its members. As
Mary Ann Glendon has observed in her pioneering work on the role
of the family,' so long as land was the major form of wealth, the
family was the basic governing unit in society.' Ownership and authority over society's most productive assets thus depended on family
relationships." Marriage, most often arranged by parties other than
the principals, secured alliances, guaranteed legitimacy, and, particularly during the days of primogeniture, determined the right of succession.1 Individuals were not allowed to alter so fundamental a
part of the social structure.'
The second difference between commercial and domestic agreements concerns the equality of the parties. In commercial agreements, the parties are presumed equal. Where they are not, special
Dist. Ct. App. 1959), decided in the pro-development Florida of the 1950's, limited the rights
of those immediately affected to oppose private development. In contrast, construction on the
Pacific coast outside Los Angeles is treated as a matter having a major public impact. See, e.g.,
the regulations invalidated in Nolan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
8. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981).
9. Id. at 16. See also Demos, The American Family in Past Time, 34 THE AM.
SCHOLAR 422 (1963); J. FLANDRIN, FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES 154 (1979); Smelser &
Halpern, The Historical Triangulation of Family, Economy and Education, in TURNING
POINTS S293 (J. Demos & S. Boocock, ed. 1978); A. MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM (1978). See also Brinig & Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage
and Divorce, 67 TUL. L. REV. 601 (1988).
10. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between societal interests and the
differences between common law and community property systems, see Donahue, What
Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1979).
11. In feudal England neither husband nor wife had the power of testamentary disposition over land. Donahue, supra note 10, at 65. See also Professor Graham's observations that:
Illegitimacy had historically been used to assure that wealth and authority
would pass only to the true biological heirs of males who controlled the devolving assets. . . . Requiring a woman to attach herself to one male provided assurance to that male that he was the father of any child borne by that woman.
Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291,
311-12 (1982).
12. Another way of expressing this is to say that private agreements will be allowed to
govern only when flexibility and variety are more valued than certainty and stability. In a
complex modern society, the variety of commercial agreements is virtually endless and the rate
of innovation makes systematic regulation difficult. On the other hand, in dealing with family
structure from feudal times through the days of Queen Victoria, society attempted to reinforce
a relatively inflexible model of the family with fixed obligations among family members. Of
course, the relative importance of these values may change over time. Thus, the wife's dower
rights, which, in the early middle ages were determined by agreement at the time of the marriage, became fixed at no less than one-third by the fourteenth century. Donahue, supra note
10, at 77.
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rules or regulations may protect the more vulnerable party."8 In the
domestic sphere, on the other hand, it is impossible to overstate the
hierarchical and inherently unequal view of family relationships that
flourished prior to the twentieth century. 14 To quote Jeremy
Bentham:
But why is the man to be the governor? Because he is the
stronger. In his hands power sustains itself. Place the authority
in the hands of the wife, every movement must be remarked by
revolt on the part of the husband. This is not the only reason: it
is also probable that the husband, by the course of his life, possesses more experience, greater aptitude for business, greater
powers of application. 15
With that view of the appropriate relationship between husband and
wife-and similar views of the relationship between parents and
children-the idea of bargain was absurd. If man was to be the
"governor," there was no utility to agreement. The law sanctioned
his authority, with or without the consent of the governed. The woman was viewed as in need of protection, not from her husband's
authority, but from her own foolishness. 6
Finally, and related to the other two distinctions, is the willingness of the judiciary to intervene in disputes. In the commercial
sphere, at least over the course of the last century, courts have become involved in all manners of commercial disputes. The barriers to
litigation erected by the common law rules of pleading, narrow definitions of liability in contract and tort, and limitations on third party
suits have come tumbling down."7 At the same time, the courts have
13. The classic example of this is consumer protection legislation. In societies of individual merchants such legislation is unnecessary. With the growth of large corporations such
protection has become commonplace. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 9-12.
14. J. FLANDRIN, supra note 9, at 148-54; F. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 72 (1978); Olsen, The Family and the Market, A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1516 (1983); J.S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, ON
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 194 (1926); M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 111; Virginia Ry.
& Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 91 S.E. 632 (1917); Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California'sCommunity Property System, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1976).
15. Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Development Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1048 (1972).
16. In invalidating antenuptial agreements that provided for the forfeiture of an innocent wife's right to support, for example, courts were concerned about the possibility of the
husband's unequal bargaining power before the marriage and the prospect that the dependent
wife would become a ward of the state. Note, supra note 5, at 532-37.
17. See, e.g., the evolution of strict liability rules and the declining importance of privity
of contract described in Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) and
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966).
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remained wary of becoming involved in disputes over which spouse
is to take out the garbage and which is to do the dishes and wary of
being held hostage to a vindictive spouse's desire to use the legal
system to exact revenge." Whether or not such fears of a flood of
litigation were realistic, the idea of judicial resolution of domestic
disputes was both unpleasant to lawyers and judges and inconsistent
with the simple, self-executing model of the family as a hierarchical
structure vesting authority in the husband. 9
Thus, in examining the differences between commercial agreements and domestic bargains, three differences emerge which define
the limits of contract: (1) does the bargain implicate third party or
societal concerns that override the interests of the parties to the contract? (2) is the relative bargaining power of the parties such that
society has confidence in the outcome? and (3) does enforcement pose
inordinate difficulties?
In dealing with commercial relationships, the predominant answer to these questions for the last century has been no."0 In the
domestic sphere, the very idea of contract has been inconsistent with
the idea of family for all three of the reasons described above. Status,
not contract, has therefore governed the family."
18. For example, although most states recognize a marital duty of support, few courts
will hear claims of inadequate support during an on-going marriage. See, e.g., Maguire v.
Maguire, 157 Neb. 226, 238, 59 N.W. 336, 342 (1953); H. KAY, SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION 190-91 (1980); M. GLENDON, STATE LAW AND THE FAMILY 78-105 (1977); H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 186 (1968); Shultz, supra note 1, at 232-36 and
authorities cited therein. In addition, courts are reluctant to intervene in parental disputes over
childcare so long as the parents remain married. See People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d
660, 661 (N.Y. 1936); Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 478, 107 So. 2d 885, 888 (Ala.
1959); Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431 (1958), affd, 154 N.E.2d 820 (Ohio 1959); Glendon, Power and Authority in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections of Changing
Ideologies, 23 AMER. J. Comp. L. 1, 21 (1975).
19. See Balfour, 2 K.B. 571, discussed in Kahn-Freund, Inconsistencies and Injustices
in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133, 138 (1952). Cf Olsen, The Family
and the Market, A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1563
(1983).
20. For those subsets of commercial agreements where the answers are different, legislation, regulation, or contract doctrines such as unconscionability have limited the enforcement of
private agreements. See F. KESSLER, G. GILMORE & A. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 14-17 (3d ed. 1986).
21. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163-65 (1864). Agreements altering legally imposed obligations or relationships have traditionally been unenforceable. For example, most states continue to forbid marriages involving homosexual couples, incest, polygamy, underage parties, or
marriages for a limited term. See H. CLARK, supra note 18, §§ 2.8-2.15.
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The Role of Domestic Contracts in the Modern Era

In applying the three criteria for determining the role of contract in the modern family, it is necessary to start with the transformation of marriage. The major reason for concluding that family
agreements did not meet the first criterion, i.e., that they implicated
interests transcending those of the parties to the agreement, was the
role of the family in governing land at a time when land was the
most important source of wealth and productivity. Land holdings,
however, have long since given way to commercial ventures as the
major source of productivity, and commercial ventures have evolved
from small, family held enterprises to large corporate undertakings.
Employment has replaced inheritance as the most important determinant of income and status."
With the family no longer conferring social or economic authority, the justification for marriage has changed from social obligation
to love and affection. Marriage is no longer seen as a hierarchical
relationship in which the husband is given sole authority over the
family holdings and its inferior and dependent members. Rather, it
has become-at least as an ideal-a partnership between equals
freely choosing to associate with each other.2 " With this transformation, marital agreements now have their principal effect on the parties. They have far fewer implications for any broader set of societal
concerns, with one notable exception-provision for childrearing.
The societal interest in children has both broad and narrow aspects. As a society, we transmit moral and cultural values through
our childrearing practices. Our ability to preserve the values of our
civilization depends on our ability to ensure their survival from one
generation to another. Collectively, we therefore have an interest in
fostering appropriate child care practices.
On a less cosmic plane, society also has an interest in avoiding
the consequences of improperly caring for its children. To the extent
we collectively provide aid for dependent children, for example, we
have a financial interest in seeing that parents provide sufficient
22. M. GLENDON, supra note 8, at 16.
23. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985); Glendon, Marriage and the State, The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 706 (1976);
Freed & Foster, Marital Property Reform in New York: Partnershipas Co-Equals, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 169, 174 (1974); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an
Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Sharp, The Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.L.
REV. 197, 198-201 (1987); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 242-43
(1983).
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child support. To the extent improperly cared for children contribute
to crime, delinquency, or simply the underutilization of human resources, we have an interest in avoiding those results. In short, while
the family as an institution is now far more concerned than in earlier
times with the interests of putatively equal husbands and wives, society retains a substantial interest in the arrangements which concern
provision for children.
Application of the second criterion, the relative bargaining positions of the parties, has also changed dramatically with the changing
role of the family. The patriarchal model with its emphasis on male
authority and its presumption of inequality is gone. In its place, the
partnership ideal presumes that husbands and wives, and indeed,
men and women generally, are equals capable of reaching appropriate bargains."' To the extent agreements address the parties' relationship to each other, therefore, the law has become increasingly
willing to enforce them.2 The modern debate centers not so much on
the propriety of contracts between husbands and wives per se, as on
the degree of regulation justified by many wives' continuing economic dependence on their husbands and by the different social conditioning afforded men and women. 6
Finally, the courts are more willing to intervene in domestic
matters. The traditional substantive basis for nonintervention, reinforcement of patriarchal authority, is gone. With the increasing frequency of divorce, the courts routinely decide cases involving the
24. For a discussion of the changing view of marriage as a single unit headed by the
husband to a union of two independent, autonomous, and putatively equal actors, see Shultz,

supra note 1, at 274-77.
25.

See generally Shultz, supra note 1; L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT

(1981); Temple, Freedom of Contract and Intimate Relationships, 8 HARV. J.L. & Pus.
POL'Y. 121 (1987); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 954 (1979). In addition, the modern trend favors the regulation of pre-marital agreements governing property and support obligations upon divorce instead of a presumption that
all such agreements made in contemplation of divorce are void as against public policy. The
Uniform Premarital Agreements Act (UPAA) recognizes the validity of property and support
obligations at death or divorce if they are in writing, do not otherwise violate public policy, are
not unconscionable, and meet certain requirements concerning voluntariness, reasonable disclosure of the other party's financial obligations, and the like. See UNIFORM PREMARITAL

AGREEMENTS ACT at Prefatory Note to Discussion Draft dated March 11, 1983, §§ 2, 3, and
6(a).
26. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 25, at 246. Nonetheless, the debate appears to concern the appropriate degree of judicial supervision of such agreements rather than the validity
per se of those agreements. See supra note 25. The courts are more likely to invalidate agreements altogether when a substantive concern, such as support for a completely dependent
spouse or minor child, is at issue rather than when the issue is solely one of relative bargaining
power. See, e.g., cases cited by Temple, supra note 25, at 130.
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amount of support, division of property, and custody of the children.
The courts, however, remain reluctant to intervene where such intervention might disrupt an ongoing marriage,217 where it conflicts with
an important substantive interest such as the rights of parents over
their children,"8 or where it runs afoul of constitutional limitations
such as the right to privacy. 2'9
Nonetheless, with all these changes, as well as the growing diversity in private relationships, 0 the role of contract in governing
family relationships is growing. Presumptive opposition is being replaced with case-by-case analysis, and regulation rather than prohibition is being used to overcome potential problems. 1 Family matters, and, indeed, intimate relationships generally, are no longer a
separate world into which contract and the courts dare not tread."2
27. See discussion in Temple, supra note 25, at 161-65. See also Kilgrow, 268 Ala. at
478, 107 So. 2d at 888, and the more general discussion in Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interest of the Child, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 15-16, 22 (1987).
28. See, e.g., Sisson, 271 N.Y. at 286, 2 N.E.2d at 661; In re Polovchak, 104 Ill. App.
3d 203, 432 N.E.2d 873 (1982), aff d, 454 N.E.2d 258 (1983). Even in cases involving abuse
and neglect, where the child's interest clearly justifies state intervention, the courts remain
reluctant to interfere with parental rights and authority over the child. See In the Matter of
Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 412, 537 A.2d 1227, 1243 (1988).
29. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). Cf Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). A major component of this right to
privacy is a right to be free from "offensive" government interference, such as mandatory
sterilization, with a positive right. Professor John Robertson has written several articles in this
area arguing for recognition of a constitutionally protected right of procreation. See Robertson,
Embryos, Families and ProcreativeLiberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 939 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos]; Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth,69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]. However, Professor Robertson's analysis confuses
what is essentially a negative right, that is, a right to be free from particularly offensive government interference, such as mandatory sterilization, with a positive right, viz. a right to
procreate, that justifies state sanction of private activities such as in vitro fertilization and
surrogate agreements and, indeed, state intervention, if necessary to effect specific performance
of at least the custody provision of surrogate agreements.
In discussing the issue of government interference in the area of procreation, it is important to distinguish objections based on the form of intervention necessary to accomplish specific
performance of surrogate contracts from the validity of the agreement itself. A couple contemplating marriage, for example, might for religious reasons agree that neither of them will ever
undergo or attempt to convince the other to undergo an abortion in the case of an unwanted
pregnancy or the existence of serious birth defects. If the woman changes her mind, breach of
the agreement might be grounds for divorce (or in states that consider fault in awarding
spousal support, grounds for a lower support award), even though the courts would not enjoin
her from proceeding with the abortion.
30. See Shultz, supra note 1; Temple, supra note 25.
31. See supra note 25.
32. Contracts concerning "intimate relationships" between unmarried couples have traditionally presented a different set of problems, such as the importance of public policy discouraging divorce and illegitimacy, and reinforcing traditional morality generally. See discus-
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The Application of Contract Principles to Surrogate
Agreements
C.

The validity of surrogate agreements, like the enforceability of
domestic contracts generally, depends on their place on the continuum between private interests and public concerns. To determine
that place requires a return to the principles with which the article
started: that is, definition of the concerns that transcend the interests
of the parties to the agreement, evaluation of the relative bargaining
positions of the parties in order to determine the validity of consent,
and consideration of the difficulties enforcing such agreements would
impose on society.

1. Societal and Third Party Interests
In addressing the first issue, definition of the concerns that transcend those of the genetic parents, it is helpful to separate the agreement to conceive the child from the agreement that the genetic father
will have custody. Historically, the major focus of state efforts to
ensure appropriate child care has been on the act of conception.
With only married couples likely to have both the commitment and
the resources to provide adequate care for their offspring, state regulation sought to discourage out-of-wedlock births by reinforcing
traditional moral values, banning sexual relations outside of marriage, and stigmatizing illegitimate children and their unmarried
mothers. 8 In the modern era, there is less emphasis on the family as
the exclusive source of financial security and a greater emphasis on
individual autonomy and privacy."' Accordingly, individual choice in
reproductive matters has been accorded greater protection while the
state attempts to enforce parental responsibility for child care more
directly.8
sion supra note 3 and infra note 33 and accompanying text. However, even in this area the
courts are increasingly willing to enforce private agreements. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.
3d 660, 557 P.2d 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976) and the summary of recent developments inTemple, supra note 25, at 136-39.
33. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 25, at 99; Graham, supra note 11, at 311-12; Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Unmarried Mothers and Their Children: An
Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection and the Uniform ParentageAct,
23 KAN. L. REv. 23 (1974); M. GROSSMAN, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 196-97 (1985).
34. See Graham, supra note 11, at 310-14; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note
29, at 405.
35. The history of artificial insemination is instructive in this regard. In many jurisdictions, a married woman's use of artificial insemination was once equated with adultery and the
resulting child was considered illegitimate. Since then, many states have enacted statutes authorizing artificial insemination, usually with a provision recognizing the mother's husband as
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A contract that provides for the conception of a child through a
surrogate arrangement is consistent with the state interest in ensuring that the child will be adequately cared for. In surrogate arrangements, the child is conceived through a process of artificial insemination unlikely to undermine the genetic parents' marriage. The
genetic father is married, and he and his wife are committed to providing care for the child. The genetic mother's involvement in the
process is neither accidental nor unintended.
Bestowing state sanction upon an unmarried couple's decision to
beget a child which only one of them will raise is unsettling in light
of the long history of state efforts to regulate conception. Yet, without the surrogate agreement, a father capable of providing a good
family environment would be unable to have a child of his own. 6
Thus, the overall intent of surrogate contracts is consistent with
the legal father of the child. Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers
and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 639, 641-43 (1983). See also Smith, A
Close Encounter of the FirstKind: Artificial Insemination and an EnlightenedJudiciary, 17
J. FAM. L. 41 (1978-79). Ironically, such legislation poses legal problems in surrogate mother
arrangements since laws designed to facilitate artificial insemination may recognize the genetic
mother's husband, rather than the genetic father, as the legal father of the child. See Clark,
New Wine in Old Skins: Using Paternity-SuitSettlements to FacilitateSurrogateMotherhood,
25 J. FAM. L. 483 (1986-87); Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw.
ENG. L. REV. 373, 375-78 (1981); Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for
Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465 n.69 (1983) and accompanying text.
36. Of course, there is no guarantee that all men who would like to become fathers
through a surrogate agreement are in fact fit parents able to offer a good family environment
for the child. The state interest in insuring that children are properly provided for, as well as
the child's interests, therefore, justify mandatory screening of prospective parents at least for
basic fitness. See Wadlington, supra note 35, at 503-05.
Some scholars argue that it is inconsistent to require screening of parents entering into
surrogate contracts when no screening is required before the conception of other children. See
Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty, supra note 29, at 429-36 and Robertson, Embryos, supra note
29, at n.241. Such an argument misses the point. Screening of prospective parents in other
contexts (e.g., unwed couples) is not imposed because it would be impractical and offensive,
not because the interests of the children are any different. In the surrogate context, the child is
conceived through use of artificial insemination, after a contract is signed, and usually after an
agency has conducted minimal screening of the surrogate mother. A mandatory screening requirement would be relatively easy to administer, and no intrusion into intimate relationships
would be involved.
Another issue concerns the appropriate scope of screening. The easiest form of screening
to justify is screening for the type of unfitness that would justify removing a child from any set
of parents. It is also easy to justify screening that would aid the surrogate mother's choice to
enter or decline to enter into the contract. Beyond that, any further restrictions, such as a
limitation of surrogate contracts to cases where the genetic father's wife is unfertile, would
depend on the balance between the strength of the father's interest in genetically-related children versus the strength of the competing state interest. See Andrews, The Aftermath of Baby
M: Proposed State Laws on Surrogate Motherhood, HASTINGS CENTER RPr. 31, 35 (Oct.Nov. 1987).
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traditional notions of family responsibility."7
The degree to which the determination of custody, as opposed to
the agreement to conceive the child, 8 implicates interests beyond
those of the genetic parents depends on the existence of a societal
interest in having children remain with their mothers, rather than
their fathers and in reinforcing maternal, as opposed to paternal,
identification with offspring. In human reproduction, parental care is
37. A separate issue exists as to whether there continues to be some societal interest in
discouraging the conception of children who will not be raised by their genetic mothers and
fathers. The issue is posed most directly by the possibility of an infertile couple "commissioning" a child to be conceived for the purpose of adoption. Unlike the situation in traditional
adoptions, the child would not have been conceived but for the adoption agreement. It is possible to oppose such adoption agreements on the grounds that: (1) the adoptive parents may be
less committed to the child than genetically-related parents, particularly in the event of birth
defects or adverse financial or marital circumstances; (2) adoption itself creates some difficulties
for children and the conception of children solely for that purpose should therefore be discouraged; and (3) so long as other children remain available for adoption, new children should not
be conceived who might make the existing children that much more difficult to place. For an
excellent discussion of this issue, see Page, Donation, Surrogacy and Adoption, 2 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 161 (1985).
All three of the aforementioned concerns are also present in artificial insemination by
donor (AID) cases without preventing widespread acceptance of the practice. Both the AID
and the surrogate cases can be distinguished from the "pure" adoption cases in that the genetic
parent's involvement alleviates the aforementioned concerns and provides an offsetting benefit
by advancing that parent's interest in genetically-related offspring.
Nonetheless, there are some differences between AID and surrogacy. In most AID cases,
the sperm donor is'anonymous and the mother experiences the growing identification with the
child that pregnancy and childbirth encourages. If the child is born with birth defects or if the
mother's financial or marital circumstances change, there can be no dispute as to maternity
and no readily available genetic father upon whom to cast blame or shift responsibility. In the
surrogacy context, the not uncommon desire to deny responsibility, particularly in the event of
a birth defect which can be traced to conditions during the pregnancy (e.g., a fall), the delivery,
or the mother's genes, can give rise to many disputes.
The child's adoption anxieties should be approximately the same in AID and surrogacy
cases though it should be easier to keep AID a secret if the parents wish to do so. Separation
anxiety from the birth mother, on the other hand, will be a factor only in surrogacy cases, but
the evidence as to how much of an impact that has on the child is unclear. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 527-38
(1984). Finally, the effect on hard-to-adopt children should be the same.
Accordingly, while surrogacy agreements are more like AID cases than like agreements
commissioning a child for adoption by unrelated parents, they potentially pose additional difficulties for children. Whether those difficulties justify the banning of surrogacy agreements
depends on the strength of the father's interest in having genetically-related offspring.
38. For one thing, direct state action to prohibit surrogate conception is unlikely given
the offensiveness of the intrusion into such a private matter. See discussion in Baby M, 109
N.J. at 396, 537 A.2d at 1227, concluding that the right to procreate is not implicated in these
cases because the father is free to procreate as he wishes; rather, it is the custody determination
that is before the courts. At most the state is likely to discourage surrogate agreements. See
Bard & Kurlantzick, Contracts After the Baby M Case, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 1988, at 13,
distinguishing payment for conception from payment for custody or for the surrender of parental rights.
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a prerequisite for survival. Yet, for virtually all of human history
preceding the last thirty years, children were something that happened rather than something planned. Controlling reproduction required abstinence; abstinence within marriage was viewed as unnatural. For a married couple, therefore, "accidental" pregnancies
might be a common occurrence,"' but once the pregnancy occurred,
or at least once the pregnancy became visible, a variety of biological,
sociological and psychological factors encouraged the mother's identification with the newborn child."O This identification with the child
tended to reinforce the parents', and to a much greater degree the
mother's, commitment to care for the child."'
Even with greater choice in modern reproductive matters, a
long term commitment to the resulting children is still critical and
far from automatic. It is therefore possible to argue that there is a
societal interest in insuring mothers' commitment to their newborn
children,"" and that anything that interferes with the sociological
forces reinforcing that commitment, even if the interference is symbolic only, is harmful.' Given this view, sanctioning the validity of
surrogacy agreements would support the decision of a mother to beget and carry to term a child to whom she has no larger commitment. To sanction such agreements made before the birth of the
child and in exchange for payment would compound the affront.""
39. Lecture by M. Shultz, Professor of Law, Univ. of California, Berkeley, on "Varying
Feminist Perspectives on Surrogate Motherhood," to the American Association of Law Professors, Annual Meeting, Section on Women in Legal Education (Jan. 8, 1988).
40. The father experienced growing identification with the child to a much lesser degree
and, at least until relatively modern times, the mother's care was more important than the
father's for infant survival. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 25, at 99-105.
41. To practice infanticide is merely to withdraw parental care. The form of the commitment necessary to insure survival, on the other hand, is quite varied. Wet-nursing practices,
use of nannies, and even the use of foster parents during the child's early years may be consistent with a sufficient commitment to insure the child's survival and, in most cases, well-being.
42. Lisa Newton identifies the fear that the child will be taken away from its mother as
the major source of opposition to surrogate motherhood. However, any fear that the mother
will be exploited is less basic than the fear of maternal abandonment. See Newton, Surrogate
Motherhood and the Limits of Rational Ethics, 9 LoGos (1988).
43. In modern society, where the demand for babies available for adoption is high, as
are the rates of child abuse and divorce, the long term commitment to the child may be more
important than the commitment immediately after birth. Nonetheless, American society looks
more to mothers than to fathers for both types of commitment, although the father's involvement generally becomes more important with older children. See L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985), on custody and child support patterns following divorce.
For a discussion of the importance of symbolic arguments, see Cass, Coping with Life,
Law and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law and Economics: Debate, 67 B.U.L.
REv. 73, 83-85, 89-90 (1987).
44. Whether payment for the relinquishment of custody is offensive in itself is, in the-
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Yet, aside from the symbolic, it is difficult to identify a societal
interest that is in fact injured by surrogacy arrangements. The pregnancy is not accidental. Indeed, the parents conceive the child with
far more advance thought, care and commitment than attends the
conception of most children. The mother is not abandoning the child.
She is simply agreeing that the child's father, who can be screened
for fitness, will have custody." Evidence assessing the importance of
biological ties between mothers and their genetically related offspring
7
is inconclusive." Moreover, other interests, including the father's
interest and the societal interest in promoting gender equality must
be weighed against the symbolic injury to the maternal bond." 8
ory, a separate question. Without some societal interest in reinforcing maternal bonding, however, the issue of payment carries little weight. Compare, for example, the relative paucity of
opposition to payment of sperm donors in artificial insemination cases. But see Radin, Market
Alienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1932-33 (1987) (arguing that commercial surrogacy
might lead to the "comodification" of children, and that the major harm would be the differential rates women could command for their children); Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate
Parenting, 13 HASTINGS CENTER RPT., Oct. 1983, at 35.
Similarly, the decision to relinquish custody before conception raises issues distinct from
the decision to relinquish custody after birth. Since maternal bonding occurs after birth, the
symbolic interference with the bonding process is much less, and any objection based on the
uninformed nature of the mother's consent disappears. Moreover, as a practical matter, the
courts are unlikely to set aside a custody agreement between an eager father and a mother who
asserts that she does not want custody. See infra notes 51 and 66.
45. Most surrogate contracts contain other provisions, including provisions for the severance of the mother's maternal rights and adoption by the genetic father's wife. Such provisions
are less central to surrogate agreements than the issue of which parent will have custody of the
child.
Custody agreements, even if otherwise enforceable, are usually subject to a "best interests
of the child" standard. In practice, however, such agreements tend to be enforced unless the
would-be custodial parent is unfit or the child's interest in overriding the agreement is otherwise compelling. See infra note 51.
46. Chambers, supra note 37.
47. See Robertson, Embryos, supra note 29, at 1023. The father's interest in being able
to produce and raise genetically-related offspring is as difficult to assess as the societal interest
in reinforcing maternal bonds. See, e.g., the New Jersey Supreme Court's discussion of this
issue in Baby M, 109 N.J. at 396, 537 A.D.2d at 1227.
48. It is arguable that in modern American society, reinforcing paternal identification
with and commitment to children is more important than strengthening maternal identification
and commitment. Parental care immediately following birth is less an issue today than the
issue of parental commitment for the twenty or more years necessary to insure a productive
adult. While men are statistically more likely than women to be able to provide appropriate
education and a secure financial environment for the child, they are also more likely to be
abusive parents and less likely to remain with the child through adulthood. Whatever the
parental bonding immediately after birth, it is the paternal bond in later years that is most in
need of repair.
.In addition, it has been argued that equality for women depends on lessening the emphasis on maternal child care in favor of an ideal of shared responsibility. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN,
supra note 25, at 98-120. These authors would deny that the baby needs Mommy any more
than Daddy and they would argue for gender-neutral custody presumptions. See also Elster,
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Balancing these interests may be commonplace for legislatures,
but such balancing raises issues which the courts, and perhaps lawyers generally, are not well suited to resolve. To conclude that the
societal interest in maternal bonding overrides the parents' interests
in being able to use surrogate agreements to advance their own ends
depends on the importance given to maternal child care, the degree
of symbolic injury surrogate agreements pose, and the importance of
the offsetting interests in alleviating the problems arising from infertility and in promoting gender equality. In the absence of legislative
guidance or clear societal consensus, the courts are left with little
more than their own instincts to guide them.
Third party interests of the child are easier to define. It is difficult to argue on any level that the child has an interest in preventing
conception. Therefore, the child's interests should be defined in terms
of the custody agreement.4 In other contexts, children have a right
to financial support and a right not to be placed in an unfit or abusive environment that overrides the interests of their parents and that
justifies judicial review of any custody or support agreement."0
supra note 27, at 10.
Finally, it is also arguable that reinforcement of the maternal bond hurts both women and
children to the extent that it convinces women who are not fully prepared or able to care for
their children to keep them simply because it is too painful to give them up. In more traditional times, the importance of maternal bonding did not prevent strong social support for
unwed mothers who chose to place their children for adoption. Reinforcement of parental
bonding does not necessarily override all other interests.
49. See Robertson, Embryos, supra note 29, at 1013. Society, however, may have an
interest in preventing conception on the grounds that the harm to children from such arrangements outweighs the benefits from their birth.
50. R. MNooKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 158-60, 469-72, 628 (1978); Boden v.
Boden, 42 N.Y.2d 210, 366 N.E.2d 971, 397 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1977); Wadlington, supra note
35, at n.160. In other contexts, children also have a right not to be sold. The laws prohibiting
baby-selling stem primarily from two concerns: (1) that the mother, who could place the child
for adoption with a number of well-suited families, will chose a less suitable family because of
the fee; and (2) that the financial incentive, together with the mother's emotional distress at the
unwanted pregnancy, leaves her unusually open to exploitation.
The surrogacy context can be distinguished on several grounds. First, a child placed for
adoption has an interest in being placed with the most suitable family available since the child
will not, in any event, be placed with a genetically-related parent. A child born as a result of a
surrogate arrangement has an interest in being placed with a suitable genetic parent, not the
best of all possible adoptive parents. Second, with respect to the exploitation of the mother, she
enters into the contract at a time when she is not pregnant. Her potential exploitation is thus
reduced to the coerciveness of payment. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. Finally,
the genetic father's interests differ from those of an adoptive parent. Adoptive parents have no
involvement with the particular child until shortly before receiving custody. Had there been no
adoption agreement, the same child would still have been conceived and born to the same
mother. On the other hand, in surrogate agreements the genetic father would not have agreed
to the conception of the child but for agreement that he would have custody. The genetic father
might harbor serious reservations about the genetic mother's suitability to raise his child. The
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In the surrogate context, these rights justify prospective screening of the genetic father and his wife, denial of custody to unfit parents, and the enforcement of support obligations independently of the
contract even in situations where both genetic parents oppose such
measures. What the child does not have is the right to override his
parents' determination of custody in order to choose one fit parent
over the other. 5 In a divorce in which custody is settled by agreement, for example, or in artificial insemination by donor (AID)
cases, the child cannot challenge the custody determination simply
because he or she would be better off with the other parent.62
Even when a "best interests of the child" standard is applied,
the child's interest, as a practical matter, in being able to choose between two fit genetic parents is generally less than the interest of his
parents in being able to settle the matter between themselves. 8 Acgenetic mother's position is exactly the opposite. Unless she entered the contract in bad faith,
her willingness to sign the agreement indicated that she was willing to conceive the child
knowing that the father would have custody. Thus, in the surrogate context, the greater the
father's concern for the child, the greater his loss if the contract is not enforced. In contrast, the
greater the surrogate mother's concern for the child, the more likely she is to have entered into
the agreement confident of the father's ability to provide for the child. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Katz, SurrogateMotherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.
L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1986).
51. Even in states that apply a "best interests of the child" standard to custody determinations, parental agreements are rarely overturned. First, where the parents are truly in agreement, it would be an extraordinary intrusion for a court to insist that a parent take custody
when that parent has agreed that the other shall have primary responsibility for the child.
(Where the parents are not "truly in agreement," separate issues concerning the validity of
consent are raised.) Second, attempts to determine which of two fit parents would be better for
the child are difficult and potentially disruptive; thus, there is considerable utility in encouraging agreement. See Elster, supra note 27, at 12-15. Finally, the courts are most likely to
intervene when concerned that the agreement would place the child in an unfit environment
rather than an environment that is less than optimal. Accordingly, while the child's interests in
the custody determination may justify screening and/or state sanction of any final custody or
adoption determination, the interest is not compelling enough in itself to justify the prohibition
of surrogacy agreements. See R. MNOOKIN, supra note 50, at 628.
52. Society also fails to recognize the child's right to oppose custody agreements solely
because he will be with his father rather than his mother or, in AID cases, because he will not
be with both genetic parents. While a convincing argument can be made that society should
discourage conception except when both genetic parents are committed to raising the child, the
implications of such a policy are sufficiently far-reaching that it cannot justify the prohibition
of surrogacy alone. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
53. Even if the child's interest in being with one fit parent rather than the other is
insufficient to invalidate parental custody agreements, there is a separate question as to
whether the child has an interest in preventing custody agreements from being based on a
monetary exchange. Put more pejoratively: Does the child have an interest in not being sold?
In responding to that question in the surrogate context, the first issue is whether the right to
custody is being sold at all. Absent fraud or self-deception, the surrogate mother enters into the
contract without ever wanting or asserting a claim to the child, i.e., she would not have entered
into the agreement but for the understanding that the genetic father would have custody. Pay-
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cordingly, while the child's interests justify judicial review of any
custody determination resulting from a surrogate contract, they do
not justify rendering the contract void ab initio."
2.

Equality of Bargaining Ability

The second contract issue addresses the validity of the genetic
mother's consent. This is a controversial issue and there are two basic objections to surrogate parenthood on these grounds. The first one
concerns the question of whether a woman is capable of deciding in
advance to give birth to a baby who will be surrendered to the custody of another or whether the process of carrying the baby to term
will so inevitably affect her judgment as to make the initial decision
suspect.
In an ordinary pregnancy, there are a whole set of forces that
tend to reinforce a mother's identification with her unborn baby.
There is the mother's awareness of biological changes, the happy
anticipation of life with the newborn, and the reaction of friends and
relatives to the prospect of a new child. Do these pressures suggest
that no woman can give truly informed consent to an agreement to
surrender custody of a child until after she has experienced the birth
of that child? Or does the existence of these pressures favor a decision made before conception, i.e., a decision made at a time when the
mother is not subject to the hormonal and emotional changes that
accompany childbirth, as more dispassionate and therefore presumptively valid?
The answer depends less on contract notions about the nature of
informed consent than on normative notions about the propriety of
the decision. The very utility of contracts stems from their ability to
lock in a decision and insulate it from subsequent changes. The fact
ment is therefore irrelevant to her consent to his custody. If anything is being sold, it is the
ovum and rental of the womb. Thus, for the child's interests to prevail over the parents', the
child must be said to have an interest in not being born.
Finally, any objection to the sale of ovum on Kantian grounds should logically apply to
the sale of sperm for artificial insemination and to divorce settlements in which custody is
exchanged for financial concessions.
While it is therefore difficult to posit any interest of the child's in opposing payment, it is
still possible to argue that there is a societal interest in keeping reproductive matters free from
commercialization. See generally Radin, supra note 44.
54. Unless the contract is void ab initio or the child is said to have an interest in remaining with his mother rather than his father, there should be no presumption against enforcing
the agreement. Ordinarily, this means that the child is placed with the father rather than the
mother pendante lite, and that the determination of the child's best interests should be made in
the same manner as in other custody determinations preceded by parental agreement. See
supra note 51.
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that one party later changes his or her mind is irrelevant, unless the
reasons for the change affect the validity of the initial decision."
Surrogacy contracts anticipate the range of conflicting emotions pregnancy and childbirth may induce in both parties and the contracts
are therefore drafted to resolve custody issues in advance and to protect both parties from later changes in the other's commitment to the
child. The emotional nature of childbearing justifies efforts to ensure
that the parties to the agreement are free from duress or coercion,
that they fully understand the nature of the agreement, and that they
are capable of making such a commitment."6
Beyond these efforts to insure that the bargaining process is free
the issue
from what Arthur Leff called "procedural naughtiness,'
turns on the substance of the decision. Those who oppose surrogacy
because of the affront to the maternal bond would condemn the
mother's agreement to surrender the child. They therefore explain
her willingness to enter into the contract in terms of her underestimation of the bonding process, and they view any subsequent decision to retain custody as natural and correct. These writers value a
decision made after childbirth more highly than one made before
precisely because it is influenced by the mother's greater attachment
to the child.
Those who view surrogacy as an appropriate response to infertility problems, on the other hand, regard the first decision, that is,
the decision to enter into the surrogate agreement, as presumptively
55. It is important to emphasize that, in contract terms, the only issue is the validity of
the original surrogate contract. A later decision by the surrogate mother to retain custody may
be perfectly rational without in anyway undermining the force of the original agreement. Construction contracts provide a useful example. A construction contractor may rationally agree to
build a house for $100,000 and six months later, after labor costs have doubled, the contractor
may equally rationally refuse to build the house for less than $160,000. The fact that the
second decision is rational does not affect the validity of the agreement to build the house for
$100,000 unless the circumstances causing the contractor to change his mind make the first
agreement suspect. (e.g., the owner's failure to describe a project accurately would justify invalidation of the agreement; an increase in the market price of labor would not affect the
validity of the agreement because this is the type of risk the contractor assumed under the
agreement.).
56. The fact that many people may be able to enter into a surrogacy agreement on the
basis of an informed and rational decision does not mean that all volunteers are thus capable.
Some women may be psychologically unable to make a realistic commitment to surrender a
child in advance. Those who have not experienced childbirth may underestimate the changes
that occur during pregnancy, such that their decision is, in fact, less than wholly informed.
Psychological screening, pre-contract counseling, and requirements that surrogate mothers
have experienced other pregnancies may be justified as a way of insuring that consent is informed and freely given.

57.
REV.

Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L.

485 (1967).
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correct. They agree that many mothers will experience conflicting
emotions over the course of the pregnancy. But they conclude from
that observation that changes in both the mother's and the father's
commitments to the child are precisely the type of changes the contract was designed to guard against and that the appropriate solution
is counseling and support for the surrogate mother in order to reinforce her promise to surrender the child." In both cases, conclusions
about the utility and morality of surrogacy color discussion of the
validity of consent.
The other issue concerning the validity of the surrogate's decision to enter the contract involves the matter of payment for her services. The standard fee for such contracts is $10,000. That is enough
money to raise the possibility of poor women entering a contract they
would otherwise never have considered, only because of the financial
incentive. The risk is inherent. For most women, $10,000 is barely
adequate to compensate for the physical and financial disadvantages
of a pregnancy. For others, the amount is enough to override most
other considerations.
To a large degree, resolution of this issue turns on the nature of
human choice and the definition and value accorded to the idea of
free will. Many writers, particularly those who have been influenced
by a Marxian perspective, see human decisions as so inevitably influenced by social, economic, and cultural conditions as to make the
exercise of free choice illusory." They would argue that because
women have less access to well-paying jobs than men, because
women have the primary responsibility for child care, further limiting their access to the labor market while increasing their financial
needs, and because pregnancy is a socially encouraged condition for
women, surrogacy has been made attractive and the $10,000 fee
irresistible.
Those emphasizing protection of the woman's choice to enter
surrogacy agreements tend to exalt individual freedom and autonomy
either as a value in itself or as more likely to lead to better results in
the long run. This group would therefore see a decision to enter into
a surrogate contract because of the money involved as a perfectly
valid choice absent duress or coercion stemming from a source other
58. If the contract to surrender custody is unenforceable, and the mother can make a
legally binding decision to surrender the child only after the child is born, then counseling
designed to reinforce her decision to surrender the child would be inappropriate because of the
risk that it would unduly influence her subsequent decision to surrender custody.
59. For a discussion of Marxian theory, see Radin, supra note 44, at 1870-74, 1910-11.
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than the payment of the fee."
In the debate over surrogate motherhood, these different perspectives about the nature of human choice tend to become entangled
with moral judgments about the mother's decision to surrender custody of her child. Those who view the mother's decision to surrender
custody as unnatural or reprehensible explain her decision in terms
of financial pressures "overcoming" her free will.61 Those who emphasize the benefit to infertile couples from surrogacy arrangements
are more likely to view the mother's choice as a rational decision in
which the financial payment makes more attractive an option which
could be justified on nonmonetary grounds.
Contract principles offer no basis on which to reconcile or
choose between these competing viewpoints. Rather, they impose certain minimum conditions for free consent: informed choice, freedom
from overt coercion or duress, and sufficient screening to insure that
women are not choosing to engage in conduct they view as immoral
solely because of financial pressures.6 2 If those conditions are met,
the debate shifts to the wisdom of the practice rather than the validity of consent.
3. Feasibility of Enforcement
The final element in the attempt to define the appropriate role
for contract resolution of family law issues is the difficulty of enforcement. Surrogate disagreements are most likely to arise in a familiar context-custody disputes."' The courts can limit intervention
during the pregnancy without undermining the validity of the contract. Clauses concerning amniocentesis, abortion or prenatal care,
for example, need not be specifically enforced and any damage claim
can be resolved after the baby is born. 6 4 The father can be obligated
60. See, e.g., Kinsley, Baby M and the Moral Logic of Capitalism, Wall St. J., Apr. 16,
1987, at 31, col. 3. For a discussion of the appropriate role of private exchange, see Radin,
supra note 44, at 1859-70, 1898-1908.
61. See, e.g., S. ELIAS & G. ANNAs, REPRODUCriVE GENETICS AND THE LAW 230
(1987). See also Radin's observation that "[wie would normally view such comodification [selling oneself into slavery) as so destructive of personhood that we would readily presume all
instances of it to be coerced." Radin, supra note 44, at 1910.
62. As part of the effort to insure valid consent, state regulation of surrogacy agencies
would be appropriate. See generally Katz, supra note 50, at 13-15.
63. The ordinary remedy for breach of contract is money damages. In discussing custody, the question then becomes one not only of the validity of the contract, but also of the
propriety of specific performance of the custody provision. See infra note 67.
64. Although in more traditional pregnancies, mothers have sometimes been forced to
take precautions for the good of the fetus. See, e.g., Rush, PrenatalCaretaking: The Limits of
State Intervention With and Without Roe, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 55 (1987).
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to support the child both by the contract and by more traditional
support obligations so that in the event he breaches or the genetic
mother obtains custody, there are mechanisms to determine the parents' respective contributions. The only important issue of administration concerns the resolution of custody disputes.
The degree of difficulty involved in custody determinations will
depend on the clarity and certainty of legal and societal support for
surrogate arrangements. If the law clearly recognizes the validity of
surrogate contracts and there is broad support for that legal position,
then problems of enforceability will be minimized. The genetic
mother will be aware from the time she enters the contract that the
father will have custody. There will be no uncertainty about the legal outcome, little incentive to contest it in court, and, depending on
the degree of social approbation, reinforcement of her decision to
surrender the child during the pregnancy. 5 Any judicial determination will be relatively clear cut, since custody will go to the father
unless he and his wife are shown to be unfit." This would be a
difficult determination to make, particularly if there was effective
screening before the contract was signed.6"
65. Of course, for some women, such as Mary Beth Whitehead, a certain legal outcome
could be an incentive to consider extra-legal means. See the trial court's description of Mary
Beth Whitehead's efforts to flee to Florida to avoid surrendering custody in response to a court
order. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. Ct. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987). The New Jersey
Supreme Court ultimately characterized Mrs. Whitehead's actions as "merit[ing] a measure of
understanding" because, "it is expecting something well beyond normal human capabilities to
suggest that this mother should have parted with her newly born infant without a struggle."
Id. at 396, 537 A.2d at 1227. Because the court viewed a surrogate mother's decision to retain
custody as normatively valid, however, the court was unwilling to enforce measures such as
mandated screening, counseling, and reinforcement of the contract's validity that would alleviate such difficulties. See infra text accompanying note 85 and supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
66. This is true even if a "best. interests of the child" standard is applied to the custody
determination. So long as the contract is viewed as presumptively valid, the inquiry should be
framed in terms of whether the best interests of the child defeat the father's custody claim. (So
long as the contract is valid, the mother cannot claim custody on the basis of her own rights to
the child; however, she may support a claim on behalf of the child that the child would be
better off with her.) The child should also remain with the father rather than the mother
pendante lite unless some showing is made that the father is an unsuitable custodian. If the
inquiry is so framed, it is difficult, as a practical matter, to show that the child would be better
off with the mother rather than the father unless the father is shown to be unfit or there is a
general presumption in favor of mothers over fathers. (If the latter were true, however, it
would be grounds to invalidate surrogate custody agreements generally. See supra text accompanying notes 38-49.).
67. There is a separate argument, however, that even if surrogate contracts are not otherwise objectionable, the act of taking the child away from its custodial genetic parent is, and
that the courts should therefore exercise their equitable discretion to deny specific enforcement
of the custody provisions in surrogate agreements.
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If, on the other hand, the validity of surrogate contracts is uncertain or the states give the genetic mother a period after the birth
of the child in which to change her mind, the difficulties of administration will be compounded. During the pregnancy, the decision to
surrender custody will be continuously open to reconsideration. After
the birth, there will be a legally mandated period of uncertainty during which both sets of potential parents may be deepening their involvement with the child. Given the fact that the genetic father will
generally have greater financial resources, he will have an advantage
in securing competent counsel, and in establishing that he and his
wife are better able than the genetic mother to provide for the child.
Those advantages may persuade some surrogate mothers, like Mary
Beth Whitehead, to resort to extralegal means." The greater the uncertainty concerning custody, the greater the likelihood that both
parties will become attached to the child and the greater will be the
incentive for dispute."
In its purest form, it is possible to make this argument without attaching any special
importance to the maternal bond and without arguing that the contract is invalid. It is enough
to assert that the physical act of removing a newborn baby from its custodial genetic parent is
offensive, and that the state should not be a party to such an act unless the baby's health or
well-being are threatened. This argument effectively distinguishes AID cases from surrogacy
cases since in the case of artificial insemination, the baby is already with the party to receive
custody under the agreement and all the state has to do is fail to intervene to vindicate the
custody agreement.
However, the courts are routinely involved in custody determinations in divorce proceedings. Although the courts rarely remove infants from their mothers' custody, judicial jurisdiction and supervision are essential to the orderly administration of divorce. Similarly, judicial
willingness to enforce custody agreements in surrogacy contracts is central to the efficacy of the
practice. As such; judicial distaste for such matters must be balanced against the other interests
at stake.
In line with this debate, a Michigan court recently held that surrogacy contracts may be
characterized as contracts for personal services and that specific performance would therefore
violate the thirteenth amendment. Yates v. Keane, Nos. 9758, 9772 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Jan. 21,
1988). This may be true to the extent the father seeks to enforce the contract provisions requiring the mother to carry the baby to term. The custody provision, however, requires state intervention similar to state intervention in other types of custody disputes. No "personal services"
by the mother are required for the relinquishment of custody.
68. Mary Beth Whitehead fled with "Baby M" to Florida to avoid surrendering custody. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. Ct. at 313, 525 A.2d at 1128, reprinted in 13 FAM. L.
REP. 2001, 2003 (1987).
69. For example, the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Baby M case
may exacerbate some of the potential disputes. The New Jersey Supreme Court outlawed
surrogacy fees and custody agreements without prohibiting the practice of surrogacy altogether.
In any future surrogacy cases, no decision of the mother to surrender the child to the father
will be binding until after the child's birth, and the child will ordinarily remain with the
genetic mother pendente lite. At the same time, there will be no basis for the termination of
either party's parental rights, and should the father claim custody, the issue will be resolved in
accordance with a "best interests of the child" standard. While the fact that the baby has been
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Accordingly, while enforcement difficulties do not necessarily
justify banning all surrogate agreements, they may justify invalidating those which, because of other limitations on the freedom of the
parties to contract, contain no enforceable custody provisions. In that
case, surrogate contracts should be void ab initio rather than voidable
at the genetic mother's option. The father would be on notice that
the contract is meaningless and that custody will ordinarily go to the
mother unless she voluntarily surrenders the child or is shown to be
unfit. This should have the practical effect of deterring surrogate
70
arrangements.
II.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF CONTRACT PRINCIPLES TO
SURROGACY AGREEMENTS

Contract principles do not necessarily pose obstacles to the enforcement of surrogacy agreements. The objectives of the surrogate
contract are consistent with overall state family policy, the child is
adequately provided for (or where that is not the case, the traditional
limitations on contract ensure that the baby's interests are protected),
there is no inherent objection to allowing the parties to resolve custody, and the difficulties of administration are manageable once the
validity of the practice has been sanctioned.
Nonetheless, the central question in determining whether to recognize these contracts is the question underlying any decision to
adopt a contract model of governance: is this a matter best left to
individual arrangements or is it one where individual choice is suspect? In discussing this issue, the courts may confuse the narrower
questions determining contract validity with the judges' view of the
morality of the practice. The recent decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M,7 1 the leading case to address the vawith the genetic mother since birth may weigh heavily in the mother's favor in. any custody
fight, the father may still prevail, as did Mr. Stern with respect to Baby M, on the basis of a
comparison between the two parents' respective family lives, personalities and character. See
Baby M, 109 N.J. at 457, 537 A.2d at 1258.
70. In the absence of a valid agreement, custody presumptions are ordinarily administered in a way that favors mothers over fathers, at least in the case of infants. See supra note
66; Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns
for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473 (1979).
Moreover, courts invalidating the custody provisions in surrogate contracts may well establish
a structure for determining custody that favors mothers' claims. See supra note 69 and infra
notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
However, if commercial surrogacy is not outlawed, some prospective fathers may place
greater pressure on surrogate agencies to screen prospective mothers more carefully to disqualify those likely to have difficulty surrendering custody of the children.
71. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). In this case, William Stern and Mary Beth
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lidity of surrogate contracts to date, provides a case in point.
In declaring the surrogate contract provisions concerning payment and custody to be unenforceable, the New Jersey Supreme
Court invoked all three of the contract principles described above.
First, the court argued that the contract implicated interests transcending those of the parties to the contract, viz., state policy encouraging children to "remain with and be brought up by both of their
natural parents,

7'

and the interests of the child.7

New Jersey,

however, applies such a state policy only in conflicts between adoptive and genetic parents.7 4 It does little to discourage out-of-wedlock
births. Indeed, state legislation facilitates artificial insemination by
donor arrangements.7" Furthermore, in the Baby M decision itself,
Whitehead entered into a surrogacy contract. The contract provided that Mrs. Whitehead
would become pregnant through artificial insemination using Mr. Stern's sperm, that she
would carry the child to term, bear it, and after the child was born, deliver the baby to the
Sterns and then do whatever was necessary to terminate her maternal rights so that Mrs. Stern
could adopt the child. Mr. Stern agreed to pay Mrs. Whitehead $10,000 after the delivery of
the child and, in a separate contract, to pay $7,500 to the Infertility Center of New York City.
Id. at 411-12, 537 A.2d at 1235.
"Baby M" was born on March 27, 1988, and Mrs. Whitehead delivered her to the Sterns
on March 30. The next day, however, she went to the Sterns, told them how much she was
suffering without the child, and asked if she could have the baby for a week. Concerned that
Mrs. Whitehead might attempt suicide, the Sterns agreed. Mrs. Whitehead subsequently refused to surrender the child to the Sterns and fled with her husband to Florida when presented
with a court order awarding the Sterns custody of Baby M pendante lite. Four months later,
the Sterns located the Whiteheads in Florida. Pursuant to a Florida court order, the police
removed Baby M from her grandparents and returned her to the Sterns. Baby M has remained with the Sterns since that time. Id. at 415-16, 537 A.2d at 1236-37.
The trial court determined that the surrogacy contract was valid, but that the custody
provision would not be specifically enforced unless that remedy were in the best interest of the
child. The court then concluded that the child's interests were best served by her remaining
with the Sterns, severing Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights, granting sole custody to Mr. Stern,
and permitting adoption by Mrs. Stern. Id. at 417, 537 A.2d at 1237-38.
Mrs. Whitehead appealed the decision and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted direct
certification. Id. at 419, 537 A.2d at 1238.
72. Id. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1247.
73. Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
74. The court noted that this policy was the first stated purpose of New Jersey's previous adoption act, N.J. STAT ANN § 9:3-17 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987) (repealed 1977). The
court concluded that while the policy was "not so stated in the present adoption law ... [it]
remains part of the public policy of this State." Baby M, 109 N.J. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1247.
In invoking this policy, the supreme court condemned the termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights and the adoption by Mrs. Stern as inconsistent with state adoption statutes. Id. at .423-34, 537 A.2d at 1241-46. The termination and adoption issues, however, are
distinct from the validity of the contract provisions governing custody. See Bard & Kurlantzick,
supra note 38, at 30. Nonetheless, the court also relied heavily on this declaration of state
policy to state the contract as a whole void as against public policy. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 43438, 537 A.2d at 1246-47.
75. New Jersey Parentage Act (1983) (codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
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the court recognized the validity of noncommercial surrogacy agreements even though they too guarantee "the permanent separation of
the child from one of its natural parents."17 1 Missing from the opinion was any discussion of the arguments identified above defining a
state interest in maternal bonding or in opposing surrogate
conception."
Similarly, in discussing the "contract's total disregard of the
best interests of the child," the court observed that "[t]here is not the
slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any time to
determine the fitness of the custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as adoptive parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect of the
child on not living with her natural mother."17 8 Yet, the court raises
9:17-38 - 9:17-59 (West Supp. 1987)). In particular, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44, dealing
with artificial insemination. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the argument that the
Parentage Act implied a legislative policy that would lead to approval of surrogacy contracts
and rejected it on the grounds that the "[Ilegislature could not possibly have intended any other
arrangement to have the consequence of transferring parental rights without legislative authorization when it had concluded that legislation was necessary to accomplish that result in the
sperm donor artificial insemination context." Baby M, 109 N.J. at 441-42 n.10, 537 A.2d at
1250 n.10.
In making this argument, the court allowed the tail to wag the dog. The surrogacy contract as a whole is not void as against public policy because it provides for the termination of
Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights. According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, it is void
because it violates the state policy encouraging children to be brought up by both of their
natural parents. However, there is no evidence that the state applies such a policy to discourage conception or to resolve custody disputes where a child will be raised by one of its genetic
parents. Accordingly, the court may correctly interpret the Parentage Act with respect to the
issue of transfer of parental rights to an adoptive (i.e., genetically unrelated) parent without
acknowledging the argument that the existence of the Parentage Act undercuts the claim that
surrogacy agreements violate state policy because the child will not be raised by both of its
genetic parents.
76. Id. at 431, 537 A.2d at 1246. Ironically, the New Jersey Supreme Court also found
that the "surrogacy contract violates the policy of this State that the rights of natural parents
are equal concerning their child." Id. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1247. The conclusion is ironic
because if there is no state interest or interest of the child's favoring placement with the
mother, then there is no reason not to allow custody to be settled by private agreement. See
supra notes 38-49 and accompanying text.
If the court were serious about this argument, it would mean that a custody agreement at
divorce placing children with their mother would be void as against public policy because it
favored the mother over the father.
77. The court clearly bases a large part of its decision on the importance of the maternal
bond. See Baby M, 109 N.J. at 435, 437-39, 441-42, 450, 459-60, 537 A.2d at 1247, 1249,
1254-56, 1259, 1261. Yet, the court, rather than make an effort to establish a state policy
favoring maternal, as opposed to paternal, bonding, insists that state policy favors equality. See
supra note 76. The court also fails to present any social science or medical evidence establishing the importance of the child's bond with the genetic mother as opposed to the genetic father
and his wife, with whom the baby will ordinarily establish a "maternal" bond shortly after
birth.
78. Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
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these concerns solely as grounds for objecting to Mrs. Whitehead's
surrender of parental rights for a fee without acknowledging that
AID and noncommercial surrogacy agreements violate the child's interests in an identical manner. 7 ' The court appears to invoke state
policy and the interests of the child only to protect the mother's right
to change her mind.
Even the court's discussion of the issue at the heart of its opinion, the validity of the surrogate mother's consent to the contract, is
not so much an inquiry into the nature of consent as an inquiry into
the morality of surrogacy. The court characterizes commercial surrogacy agreements as "taking advantage of the woman's circumstances
( . . . the need for money) in order to take away her child," and
concludes that "[w]hatever idealism may have motivated any of the
participants, the profit motive predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transactions." 80 The court further observes that,
even if payment were not an issue, "the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with the
child. She never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for
79. In both AID and non-commercial surrogacy cases, there is no greater inquiry to
determine the fitness of either the custodial parents, or the adoptive parent, or their superiority
to the other genetic parent, so this distinction is presumably an inappropriate one. AID cases,
of course, raise the issue of the child living with its "natural mother," rather than its "natural
father," but the Baby M court asserts the equality of mothers and fathers' interests in their
children. See supra note 76.
However, the larger issue is the degree to which the child's interests can be protected
without requiring the invalidation of the surrogacy agreement. It is possible to mandate screening of'the genetic father and his wife, and even an otherwise valid custody agreement would be
unenforceable if it placed the child in an unsuitable environment. See supra notes 36 and 51.
80. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 439, 537 A.2d at 1249. In discussing the reasons for concluding
that surrogacy arrangements violate the baby-selling laws, the court makes several weak arguments that fail to define why payment in itself is harmful. First, the court argues that surrogacy would not survive without payment while adoption would. Id. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248.
This merely indicates that mothers who produce children for adoption do not do so for
money-they do so either accidentally or inconveniently.
Second, the court argues that "the use of money in adoptions does not produce the problem-conception occurs, and usually the birth itself, before illicit funds are offered. With surrogacy, the 'problem,' if one views it as such, . . . is caused by and originates with the offer of
money." Id. The difficulty with this argument is that there is no "problem" (i.e., no unwanted
child).
Third, the court argues that in "surrogacy, the highest bidders will presumably become
the adoptive parents regardless of suitability." Id. However, the child's interest is in being
placed with a fit genetic parent, and screening can disqualify unsuitable couples. See supra
notes 36-49.
Other courts have split on the issue of whether baby-selling statutes apply to surrogate
arrangements. Compare Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983) with Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex. rel.
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) and In reAdoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 Misc. 2d
972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986).
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quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most
important sense, uninformed. . .. "" Moreover, the court states that
"[p]utting aside the issue of how compelling her need for money may
have been, and how significant her understanding of the consequences, we suggest that her consent is irrelevant. There are, in a
civilized society, some things that money cannot buy."aS
Implicit in the court's analysis is its presumptive disapproval of
any mother's decision to surrender her child. The court therefore
assumes that the mother consented to the surrogacy agreement only
because the financial incentive overcame her better judgment. In contrast, the court thinks that "it is expecting something well beyond
normal human capabilities to suggest that this mother should have
parted with her newly born infant without a struggle" and it therefore treats decisions made after the birth of the child, when the biological, psychological, and sociological forces encouraging identification with the child are at their height, as presumptively valid and
free from outside influence.8"
Finally, the state supreme court opinion emphasizes the difficulties in enforcing surrogate contracts, difficulties that the court identifies as arising from the mother's inevitable identification with the
child, her pain if she surrenders the child, the genetic father's and
adoptive mother's disappointment if she does not, and the necessarily
disruptive effects of a battle for custody." ' Because the court views a
surrogate mother's decision to keep the child as normatively valid, it
is unwilling to recognize measures, such as counseling or a custody
presumption favoring the father, that might alleviate the enforcement
difficulties.8 5
At the same time, the court minimizes the difficulties that arise
from the invalidation of the custody provisions. In dealing with future custody disputes arising from surrogate agreements, the court
declares that a best interests of the child standard will be applied
both to valid surrogacy agreements undertaken without a fee and to
illegal commercial agreements. In applying the standard pendante
lite, the court declares that:
When father and mother are separated and disagree, at birth,
on custody, only in an extreme, truly rare, case should the child
be taken from its mother pendante lite, i.e. only in the most
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Baby M, 109 N.J. at
Id. at 440, 537 A.2d
Id. at 459, 537 A.2d
Id. at 434-35 nn.8-9,
See supra note 65.

437, 537 A.2d at 1248.
at 1249.
at 1259.
468-69, 537 A.2d at 1246-47 nn.8-9, 1264.
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unusual case should the child be taken from its mother before
the dispute is finally determined by the court on the merits. The
probable bond between mother and child, and the child's need,
not just the mother's, to strengthen that bond, along with the
likelihood, in most cases, of a significantly lesser, if any, bond
with the father-all counsel against temporary custody in the
father. A substantial showing that the mother's continued custody would threaten the child's health or welfare would seem to
be required."'
The court then asserts that in making the final custody determination "it would be inappropriate to establish a presumption . . . in
favor of any particular custody determination. ... . However, the

court further states that "[tihis does not mean that a mother who has
had custody of her child for three, four or five months does not have
a particularly strong claim arising out of the unquestionable bond
that exists at that point between the child and its mother; in other
words, equality does not mean that all of the considerations underlying the 'tender years' doctrine have been abolished." 88 The court
concludes, in other words, that in spite of legislative assertions of
equality, that a strong presumption exists in favor of granting custody to the mother.
The New Jersey Supreme Court wrote the Baby M opinion
with the obvious intent of deterring future surrogacy agreements. 89
As a result, if surrogacy survives in New Jersey, it will be with
conflicting incentives for choice of a surrogate mother. The father's
best hope of securing a child through a surrogacy arrangement lies
either with careful screening to disqualify women unlikely to surrender the baby after birth or by choosing women unlikely to provide a
family environment meeting the best interests of the child standard.
For despite the New Jersey Supreme Court's efforts, the custody
award to the Sterns clearly leaves the custody determination in the
hands of the trier of fact, 90 not with the mother."' Therefore, even a
86. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 462, 537 A.2d at 1261.
87. Id. at 453 n.17, 537 A.2d at 1256 n.17.
88. id.
89. For example, the court observed that "all parties concede that it is unlikely that
surrogacy will survive without money." Id. at 438, 537 A.2d at 1248. The court then concluded that "[ojur declaration that this surrogacy contract is unenforceable and illegal is sufficient to deter similar agreements. We need not sacrifice the child's interests to make the point
sharper." Id. at 454, 537 A.2d at 1257.
90. Indeed, the Baby M court found that "the trial court's decision awarding custody to
the Sterns ... should be affirmed since 'its findings ... could reasonably have been reached
on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.' " (citations omitted) Id. at 457, 537 A.2d
at 1258.
91. In an ordinary custody dispute between a divorcing or unmarried couple over an
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contract voidable at the mother's option and perfectly legal under the
Baby M ruling offers no certainty as to the determination of custody.
Thus, while the court couches much of its discussion in terms of
contract principles, its interpretation and application of those principles depends on conclusions derived from normative standards. The
validity of the court's decision, therefore, turns on the propriety of
using a moral basis for invalidating private agreements in the absence of legislative action, and on the validity of the court's moral
judgments. 2
infant, the parties are likely to stand on relatively equal footing. The parties rarely have had
enough time since the breakup of their relationship to establish a new relationship, and, even if
they have married in the interim, the marriage is unlikely to have endured long enough for the
courts to be certain of its stability. Therefore, in societies that encourage mothers to invest
more heavily than fathers in caring for newborns, it makes sense to award custody to the
mothers, to encourage and reward their care for the child, to validate the parties' expectations
in such matters, and to further the interest of the child in remaining with the parent to whom
it has become most closely attached.
The relationship of the parents in a surrogate agreement is entirely different. Fathers are
ordinarily motivated to enter into surrogate agreements because they are in long-term, relatively stable marriages that have failed to produce a child. The fathers generally are able to
offer a good family environment and parents who are prepared to care for the child immediately after birth. Surrogate mothers, on the other hand, are usually willing to consider a surrogate arrangement because they are financially unable or otherwise unwilling or unprepared to
have a child they intend to raise themselves. If the surrogate mothers are married, the husbands may have no commitment to child. Precisely because all of the parties enter into surrogate arrangements with the expectation that the genetic father and his wife will have custody,
there is every reason to believe that surrogate fathers will, on average, be able to offer a better
family environment for the child than surrogate mothers.
The matter of bonding, on the other hand, is a matter of opportunity. While both parents
are usually present preceding a divorce or the dissolution of other relationships, only one set of
parents will be allowed to care for the child following a surrogate birth. Once the bonding has
occurred, the child may well have an interest in remaining with that parent on the basis of the
bonding alone.
Accordingly, in the surrogacy context, there is much less reason to believe that the child's
interests will be served by placement with the mother than in other custody disputes. In addressing the child's interests, the issue is not solely one of mother versus father, but one of
genetic father plus adoptive mother versus genetic mother plus adoptive father. To argue for a
presumption in favor of the genetic mother and her husband, therefore, requires not that the
child have an interest in maternal bonding over paternal bonding, but that the child have an
interest in bonding with its genetic mother and her husband rather than bonding with its
genetic father and his wife. In other words, the child must have an interest in bonding with the
woman who carried it to term. The Baby M opinion clearly rests its custody "advice" on such
a conclusion, but without examining the basis for preferring bonding with biological mothers.
For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix
for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187 (1986).
92. Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the "inevitable confrontation
with the ethical and moral issues involved," and the possibility of legislative action. Baby M,
109 N.J. at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264.
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CONCLUSION

In defining the appropriate ambit of private choice in reproductive matters, surrogate agreements present a particularly difficult situation because surrogacy does not lend itself to half-hearted measures. Unlike "surrogate fatherhood," surrogate motherhood is not
self-enforcing. In the more common cases where artificial insemination is used because of the husband's infertility, the genetic father
may never know who the mother is; he may never know that a child
has been conceived. Even if he knows, and wishes to contest custody,
the mother will have physical possession, paternity may be difficult
to prove and for all practical purposes, the law recognizes a presumption in favor of mothers over fathers." Accordingly, all the
courts have to do is fail to intervene to vindicate a contract providing
for surrogate fatherhood."4 With surrogate mothers, on the other
hand, the mother has physical possession of the baby and, without
recognition of the validity of the surrogate contract, a reasonable expectation that the courts will grant her custody. For a genetic father
to enter into a surrogate arrangement with any confidence in the
the law must sanction the validity of surrocertainty of the outcome,
5
gate agreements.9
Accordingly, the law cannot treat surrogate agreements as a
matter of private choice while remaining equivocal about the morality of the practice. Either the law must embrace these individual
agreements to provide for the creation and custody of a child or the
law should declare them void ab initio, clearly defining the public
policy at stake in the process. Uncertainty and dispute compromise
the interests of society, the child and the parties to the agreement to
a far greater extent than the contracts themselves ever could.

93. See supra note 64.
94. In the absence of legislative action, there may be questions of paternity and legitimacy in AID cases, but there is no question that the mother will have custody. Black, supra
note 35, at 375-78.
95. Even then, the contractual determination may be overriden by the "best interests of
the child." See supra notes 50-53.

